Bridge Dependencies

The AggLayer LxLy unified bridge (`PolygonZkEVMBridgeV2`) links Ethereum to AggLayer chains such as Katana. Assets are escrowed in the L1 bridge and a wrapped representation is minted on the destination. Katana additionally uses "Vault Bridge" tokens (e.g. vbUSDC) that deposit the escrowed asset into yield vaults, so a bridge exploit or a fault in that vault can strand or impair the remote backing — holders are exposed to both.

	Protocol / Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Spectra Finance	direct	Transport	vbUSDC MetaVault on Katana	A live MetaVault on Katana holds Vault Bridge USDC (~$1.26M TVL); the MetaVault share itself is not bridged, but its backing sits behind the AggLayer bridge
	Yearn yvUSD	direct	Transport	AggLayer LxLy + Vault Bridge USDC (vbUSDC)	`KatanaStrategy` ("Katana yvUSDC Compounder", ~$1.92M USDC) wraps USDC into vbUSDC `0x53E8…a765e` and bridges to Katana (AggLayer network 20); reports return via the bridge's `onMessageReceived` callback
	Flex	indirect	Transport	Collateral is yvUSD (which bridges to Katana)	yvUSD's Katana leg sits behind the AggLayer bridge; a fault there feeds into yvUSD's PPS, which is Flex's sole collateral and oracle input

Chainlink's cross-chain interoperability protocol. Two layers: message verification is Chainlink-operated and not protocol-configurable (a committing DON plus an independent Risk Management Network that can halt a lane), comparable to Circle's CCTP attesters. Token movement runs through a token pool the protocol itself deploys and owns — burn/mint or lock/release — where the per-protocol risk lives: the owner sets per-lane rate limits, supported lanes, and who can change them. So the model column reflects the pool mechanism, and the real protocol knobs are rate limits and pool ownership rather than a verifier quorum.

	Protocol / Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Apyx apxUSD	direct	Bridged	Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool)	TokenAdminRegistry maps apxUSD to pool `0x0e9c…5BB5` (LockReleaseTokenPool 1.6.1) — canonical apxUSD is escrowed on Ethereum; Base holds a bridged representation
	Centrifuge JAAA	direct	Mints native	Chainlink CCIP (2-of-2 MultiAdapter)	Second half of the 2-of-2 quorum with LayerZero V2; a forged message reaching the Spoke could mint JAAA, but BOTH bridges must be compromised
	Maple (syrupUSDC)	direct	Bridged	Chainlink CCIP (LockReleaseTokenPool)	LockReleaseTokenPool holds ~13% of supply on mainnet, backing bridged syrupUSDC on Base/Arbitrum/Solana

Circle's Cross-Chain Transfer Protocol moves native USDC by burning on the source chain and minting on the destination, gated by Circle's attestation service — a 2-of-2 signature quorum whose attesters are both Circle-operated and swappable by Circle. Canonical CCTP removes third-party lock-and-mint bridge risk, but the trust assumption reduces to Circle's availability and attestation finality.

	Protocol / Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Gauntlet gtUSDa	direct	Transport	Circle CCTP V2 (native burn/mint)	Bridges USDC across Base/Arbitrum/Optimism to Morpho
	Origin OUSD	direct	Transport	Circle CCTP V2	Cross-chain strategies bridge ~42% of TVL to Base and HyperEVM
	Yearn yvUSD	direct	Transport	Circle CCTP V2 (CCTPStrategy)	Bridges USDC to Arbitrum (funded, ~3.5%) and Base (added, 0 debt); Katana uses AggLayer separately
	Flex	indirect	Transport	Collateral is yvUSD (which bridges via CCTP)

Generic cross-chain messaging. Tokens bridge via the OFT / OFT-Adapter standard; security depends on the configured DVN (Decentralized Verifier Network) set and the token's mint/burn authority on each chain. The Route Security column shows the DVN quorum for the specific route named below the badge — how many independent verifiers must attest a message before it executes — where a 1-of-1 is a single point of failure (the configuration behind the April 2026 rsETH incident). LayerZero configuration is directional and can differ by route; a badge must not be read as protocol-wide coverage. Values are read onchain from the named route's receive-side ULN config, and the badge links to that receive-side OApp.

	Protocol / Token	Type	Model	Route Security	Integration	Details
	Across Protocol	direct	Transport	TODORoute not recorded	LayerZero OFT (asset routes)	The assessed asset is the V2 LP token, which is not bridged; Across integrates LZ OFT to move bridged assets through its own routes
	Cap stcUSD	direct	Bridged	3-of-3Ethereum→Katana (mint side)	LayerZero OFT Adapter ("LayerZero vault")	Adapter `0x983a…4137` escrows 25,311,191 stcUSD — ~52% of the 48.68M supply, the largest locked share on this page; Katana runs a native OFT at the same vanity address `0x8888…8888`
	Centrifuge JAAA	direct	Mints native	TODORoute not recorded	LayerZero V2 (2-of-2 MultiAdapter)	Spoke `0xEC35…25aB` holds `wards` mint authority on JAAA and mints on cross-chain message; 5 DVNs on the LZ side and a 2-of-2 quorum with CCIP mean BOTH bridges must be compromised
	InfiniFi	direct	Bridged	4-of-4Ethereum→Katana (siUSD mint side; iUSD verified separately with the same quorum)	LayerZero OFT Adapters (siUSD + iUSD)	siUSD adapter `0x5f21…c3c0` escrows 29,340 siUSD and iUSD adapter `0xdd1c…3005` escrows 4.33 iUSD; both mint native OFTs on Katana. Neither adapter holds RECEIPT_TOKEN_MINTER, so they cannot mint native supply
	Midas mHYPER	direct	Mints native	4-of-4Katana→Ethereum (native-mint side)	LayerZero OFT Adapter (MidasLzMintBurnOFTAdapter)	Adapter holds M_HYPER_MINT_OPERATOR_ROLE (mint has no onchain backing check) and the burn role
	Paxos USDG	direct	Mints native	3-of-3Solana→Ethereum (inbound)	LayerZero V2 OFT (OFTWrapper)	OFTWrapper is Supply Controller SC3 with 45M USDG mint capacity (~521 USDG/sec refill) — the bridge can mint native USDG
	Re (reUSD)	direct	Mints native	2-of-2Arbitrum→Ethereum (inbound)	LayerZero OFT (ReMintBurnAdapter)	ReMintBurnAdapter holds a live cross-chain mint path on reUSD; active on Avalanche, Arbitrum, Base, BNB; 2.5M/24h rate limit
	Resolv RLP	direct	Bridged	2-of-3Arbitrum→Ethereum (inbound; 2 of 3 optional DVNs)	LayerZero OFT Adapter	OFT Adapter `0x234c…d06c` escrows canonical RLP on Ethereum (133,516 RLP locked of 14.64M supply); remotes are bridged OFTs
	Resolv wstUSR	direct	Bridged	2-of-3Arbitrum→Ethereum (inbound; 2 of 3 optional DVNs)	LayerZero OFT Adapter	OFT Adapter `0xab17…1978` escrows canonical wstUSR (406,723 locked, ~22% of supply); live on Arbitrum, Base, BSC, Bera, Soneium, HyperEVM, TAC
	Sky USDS	direct	Bridged	2-of-2Avalanche→Ethereum (inbound; Solana route also 2-of-2)	LayerZero V2 OFT Adapter (Solana + Avalanche only)	Minor route: LayerZero handles only Solana + Avalanche (~48.7M locked, <0.7% of mainnet USDS supply) and does NOT hold `wards` on USDS. The bulk of USDS/sUSDS bridges via native rollup bridges — see the Native Rollup Bridges row
	Fluid	indirect	Bridged	4-of-4via rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum)	rsETH market exposure	Inherits rsETH's LayerZero OFT Adapter model (canonical rsETH escrowed on Ethereum)
	KernelDAO hgETH	indirect	Bridged	4-of-4rsETH OFT Adapter (Arbitrum↔Ethereum); Kelp docs confirm 4-of-4 on the L2 mint path	Wraps rsETH (Kelp DAO)	rsETH bridges via OFT Adapter `0x85d4…8Ef3`, which escrows 46,254 rsETH (~9.6% of supply) — it cannot mint native rsETH

Each rollup's own canonical bridge — the OP Stack StandardBridge (Base, Optimism, Unichain), the Arbitrum Nitro gateway, and equivalents. L1 tokens are escrowed and minted 1:1 on the L2, secured by the rollup's proof system and Ethereum rather than an external validator set or attestation service. That makes it the lowest added third-party trust of any bridge class here — no separate verifier network to trust. The main residual risk is upgradeability: the bridge contracts can be upgraded, so a malicious or faulty upgrade by their admin is the primary path by which escrowed funds could be moved or minted.

	Protocol / Token	Type	Model	Integration	Details
	Sky USDS	direct	Bridged	OP Stack + Arbitrum Nitro canonical bridges (SkyLink)	Primary USDS/sUSDS cross-chain route: ~$0.45B USDS + ~812M sUSDS escrowed on L1 and minted 1:1 on Base, Optimism, Unichain (OP Stack) and Arbitrum (Nitro). No bridge holds `wards` on USDS; LayerZero carries only Solana + Avalanche (<0.7% of mainnet USDS supply)